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1 Introduction 
Situations in which players' preferences may change over time have been studied by many 
authors. A partial list of relevant works includes Strotz (1956), Pollak (1968), Phelps and 
PoJlak (1968), Pollak (1970), Von Weizsaecker (1971), Blackorby, Nissen, Primont and 
Russell (1973). Hammond (1976). and PolJak (1976). 
One consequence of introducing the possibility of changing preferences is that deci-
sions may not be consistent in the classical sense: decision makers may regret having 
made certain choices in the past, even in situations of perfect information. Ferreira, 
Gilboa and ~laschler (1995) propose to model these situations as extensive form games 
where the different information sets of a given player define a set of agents oUhat. player. 
They consider only finite games and, after endowing each agent with a utilit.y function of 
his own. define recursiyely an equilibrium concept that takes into account two important 
features. First the equilibrium has to be immune to the possibility of coalitional devi-
ations by agents of one player and, second, it has to satisfy a certain time consistency, 
which requires that agents that appear earlier in time are considered first and that fur-
ther deviations cannot include agents that play earlier than the ones in the first deviation. 
Agreements satisfying these requirements are called credible equilibria. 
For many applications suggested in Ferreira El al., the assumption of perfect recall 
may not be the natural one. In many game models, a player is not an individual. It can 
be a state. a political party or any other organization. In such cases it is natural not only 
to assume that the different agents within this organization may have different priorities. 
but to allow the possibility of imperfect recall. I.e .. situations in which a gi\'en agent 
does not know some actions taken in the past by other agents. In this paper we take the 
challenge of providing an appropriate extension of credible equilibria to these situations 
and to the case of an infinite number of players and strategies. 
There are many difficulties for such an extension. First, the definition cannot be 
recursive because we no longer have a finite set of agents. Second. the lack of perfect 
recall causes that an agent A may not know "'hether he is playing before or after agent 
B. and at the same time. agent B may not know if she plays before or after A. This again 
generates circularities in the definition and demands a clear discussion on the notion of 
time consistency. 
'Ye address the problems of circularity by using ideas from the literature related to 
the Theory of Social Situations. initiated by Greenberg (1990). One characteristic of this 
theory is that. using a generalization of the stable sets defined by von-l\ewmann and 
~lorgenstern (1947). recursive definitions may be extended to infinite sets. The idea is to 
divide the set of agreements in a stable partition of two sets, the good and the bad, so that 
no element in the good set is dominated by any other good element. and every element in 
the bad is dominated by some good element. Of course, in our case, the domination has 
to do with de\'iations by coalitions of agents of the same player in some appropriate way. 
Such a division may not be possible, as in the cases in which one has an infinite space 
of strategies or an acyclical dominance relation. Our model has both. The second best 
is to find a weaker division on the set of agreements. A semistable partition consists 
of three sets. the good. the bad and the ugly (I~ahn and Mookherjee, 1992). where the 
good elements are dominated only by the bad ones, the bads are dominated by goods and 
the ugly set is the complement of the union of the good and the bad. This partition is 
always possible. and it is customary to choose the good and the ugly sets to define the 
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equilibrium. 
However. we find that, at least in our case. some ugly elements may be uglier than 
others. Since the ugly set may be very large (we provide an example with empty good 
and bad sets). it seems only natural to explore the structure of this set. We do that and 
propose a new relation on the ugly set based on classes of equivalence and a domination 
relation on the quotient set. The idea is to identify elements within a cycle. The partition 
on this ugly set may again not be a stable partition, but we show that the only cause 
for existence of such an ugly-ugly set is if the quotient set of the equivalence relation is 
infinite. since the new dominance relation is acyclical. Thus. to accept this set is not as 
problematic as to accept the whole original ugly set. The new definition uses then the 
original good set. the good-ugly and the ugly-ugly. and gets rid of the bad-ugly and the 
original bad. 
Abstract stable or semistable sets have proven useful in generalizing recursive defi-
nitions and in providing insights into some difficult problems in Game Theory. such as 
those related to coalitional deviations. A drawback of this methodology is the difficulty 
to show existence theorems. 'Ye dedicate a section to discuss existence issues and provide 
an existence theorem for a version of credible equilibria. 
It is important to notice that. at this stage. credible equilibria are just a generalization 
of thl' basic concept of :"ash equilibria. Refinements like sequential. perfect and the like 
are still to be adjusted to the framework of changing preferences. 
The paper is divided as follows. Section 2 is a brief presentation of the original 
model in which credible equilibria are defined. Section 3 extends the definition of credible 
equilibria to infinite games. but still assumes perfect recall. Section 4 drops the perfect 
recall assumption and studies some of the difficulties that arise by so doing. Preliminary 
Yersions of credible equilibria are provided. Section 5 studies the ugly set and proposes a 
part it ion on t his set. A final version of credible equilibrium is provided. The techniques in 
this section may be useful for many other definitions within the theory of social situations. 
Section 6 disC"lIsses existence and section I concludes. 
2 Credible Equilibria in Finite Games. 
The concept of credible equilibrium was introduced by Ferreira d al.(199.')) to handle 
situations in \vhich priorities change during the conflict. In this preliminary section we 
present their extensiw-form game model and the solution concept. called c7'fdibif fqui/ib-
rit/m. which generalizes the concept of ;\"ash equilibrium. This model is that of a finite 
game with perfect recall. In the following sections we drop these assumptions and solve 
a number of conceptual and technical difficulties that arise in the process. 
Let r = (T. P.e. c. p) be a game in extensive-form without payments at the end-
points. Here. T is a tree. P = {Po. P l ..... Pn } is the players' partition on the non-final 
nodes of T: C' = (['0 ..... Cs) where C = {u;j }J~l is the partition of Pi into information 
sets: C = {C(ujj)}1~; .. ··~· is a correspondence, where e(uij) is the set of choices which 
are available to player i at information set U! .. i: p = {pr UOj )}i=l , ... ,ko is a vector-valued 
function. where p(llOj) is a probability distribution on chance's moves at tlo .. i' 
To complete the description of the model. we endow each agent i.j with a von 
:\"eumanll-\Iorgenstern utility function hij . defined on lotteries oyer endpoints of T. For-
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mally. the game with utilities changing during the play is a six-tuple, 
r = (T, P, [T, C,p. h). 
where T, P, U, C, p are as above, and h = (hI,"" hn ), where, for an endpoint z, hi{z) = 
(h i.l (.:). hi.2 (::), .•• , hik,(Z)). 
:"otice that for each i we obtained different agents i.j at different information sets 
Ui.i of player i. The interpretation is as follows: at the beginning of play, player i believes 
that he will have the utility function hi.j when he reaches information set Uij. 
Throughout this section we assume that the game is of perfect recall according to the 
standard definition (Seiten, 1975). 
Definition 1 
A game form (T.P.U.C,p) is said to be of pe rfec/ recall if. for eVery i, (i = 1,2, ... ,11) 
and frery tu:o information sds Uij and Uik of tht samc plaYfr i, if one nodt y. yE Uik, 
comts afttl' a choict c at Ui.j, thm tVery node x in Uik comes after the samc choict c. 
By 1\ uhn's theorem (I\uhn. 1953). in presence of perfect recall. one can restrict the 
analysis to behavioral strategies. 
Formally. a behayioral strategy Sij of agent i.j is a probability distribution over the 
choices Cij at Uij. "'e denote by Sij the set of these behavioral strategies. The set of 
beha\'ioral strategies for player i is Si = X,i=1. .... k, Si..!. A n-tuple of behavioral strategies 
is s = (SI.' ... sn). and the set of these n-tuples is S = Xi=I, ... nSi. 
Let Q be a set of agents belonging to the same player. We denote by -Q the set 
J/\Q where -'I is the set of all agents (not only of the same player). For a strategy s, 
we denote by sQ the vector of strategies (Sij )ijEQ' For simplicity we write (S-i.j, s:) 
to express a deviation of agent i.j from Si.j. For sand s' in S. we write s' h.j S iff 
hi j(s') > hij (s). 
:"ow. we are ready for the definitions: 
D£'fini tion 2 
Ir( sa!! that i.j plays afler i.jo if i.j = i.jo or if tl'ery path from Uij to tht mot passes 
through Ui,in' 
Definition 3 
Ld r be a gamf of pf1ject recall u'ith utilitits changing dUl'ing tht play, let s be an n-tuplt 
of bfharioral stratEgifs. and let Q bt a sd of agwts of playtr i, containing an agfnt i.jo 
and possibly some of i's agwts that play after i.jo. A strategy sQ is said to be a credible 
dft'iation from s, struck by agwt i.jo using Q, if: 
(i) s' 'rijo S. 11'ht/'f S' = (sQ' s_Q). 
(ii) s' hj (S~ij.Sij) for all i.j E Q.i.j #- i.jo. 
(iii) So agwt of i. u·hcthtr in Q or not. that plays after i.io, can strikt a credible 
daiation from s'. 
Definition 4 
Let r be a game of pErffct rEcall u,ith utilities changing during the play. A behavioral 
strattgy profile s is calltd a crtdiblE Equilibrium (CrE) if no agEnt can sirikt a cndiblt 
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dft'iation from it. 
Remark 1 
TheSe concepts are defined recursively. For further information concerning them see Fe-
rrtim ff al. (1995). 
3 Extending Credible Equilibria to Infinite Games. 
In this section we extend the definition of credible equilibria to games with an infinit.e 
number of players, that is N = {I, 2. 3, ... }. For this purpose, we will follow the approach 
in Asheim (1991) where the notion introduced by von-r'\eumann and Morgenstern of 
a bst ract st able sets of appropria te abstract systems is used to extend recursive defini tions1 
to the infinite case. 
A von-:\'eumann and ~10rgenstern abstract system (AS) is a pair (D,:>-) where D is 
an abstract set and :>- is a dominance relation. The notation / :>- d will be interpreted to 
mean that f dominates d. Let (D.:>-) be an abstract system, and let fED. The dominion 
of f. denoted by 6.(/). is the set of all elements of D that f dominates. according to the 
dominance relat ion :>-. 
6.(/) = {d E D : / :>- d} 
6.(F) = U{6.(/) : FeD} 
That is. an element d in D belongs to 6.(F) if it is dominated by some element in 
F. A set FeD is a \'on :"eumann and ~Iorgenstern abstract stable set (ASS) for the 
system (D,:>-) if F = D\6.(F). 
Let r be a game with utilities changing during the play. Inspired by definitions 3 and 
4 an abstract system (D.:>-) is introduced. For every agent, i.j, we define Qij the set of 
all agents of i that play after i.j and Qij a subset of Qij. Define Qik similarly, and let 
sand 5 be elements of XiESSi. 
D = ({i.j.Qi,i.S): i.j E Qij C Qij sE X iE./I"Si , i E JY j E {l. .. . k i }} 
(i.j,Qij,S):>- (i.k.Qik,S) i// 
(i) i.j plays a/Ifi' i.~· 
(ii) hij(s) > hij(S). 
(iii) hih(S) > hih(hh.Li.h). for all i.h E Qij. 
(it') LQ., = LQ •. ,. 
As in the standard definition of credible equilibrium. here a deviation from an agree-
ment S. gi\'en by agent d· to members of Qi.k, is a set of instructions s given by i.j to 
members of Qij. 
lThe recursion being on the number of players. pure strategies. periods ... 
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Following the spirit of the concept of l\'ash equilibrium, agents of player i in Qi.j 
strike the deviation and other agent.s are supposed to play as agreed in s. This is stated 
in condition (iv). Condition (i) st.at.es a time consistence requirement between agents who 
can strike a deviation. Conditions (ii) and (iii) are the counterparts of conditions (i) and 
(ii) in definition 3. Condit.ion (ii) states that i.j prefers that these instructions are obeyed, 
given that agents of -Qi.j continue to follow s. l\'ote that this implies that i.j is reached 
with positive probability under s, because prior to i.j there is no distinction between 
element.s of sand s. Condit.ion (iii) implies that each member in of Qi.j is reached with 
positive probability under s. The condition states that these members actually prefer 
to comply with s. In the original definition, a condition was added to prevent further 
deviations (definition 3(iii)). For infinite games this condition is not captured in the 
dominance relation, but in the structure of the related stable set. 
The next proposition relates the ASS of (D. r-) to the definition of credible equilibrium 
for finite games of perfect recall with utilities changing during the play and allows for a 
definition applicable to infinite games of perfect recall with utilities changing during the 
play. 
Denote by rt.j the game obtained from r by fixing the strategy of every agent of 
ewry player according to s. except i.j and agents of player i that play after i.j. l\'ote 
that rt j is a one-person game possibly with several agents, i.e., at the beginning of the 
game. players think that that is the game agent i.j is facing, given that every agent other 
than him and his followers play s. Denote by i.jo an agent of player i that does not play 
after any other agent of that player. 
Proposition 5 
Lf! 1\' bt an ASS of (D. r-). Thtll. for finitt gamts (finite number of agents and of pure 
stratEgies) of pujtd rH'all u'ith utilitifs changing during tht play. Wt hare that for all 
i.j alld Qij C Qij and s E Xi=1.. n Si, (i.j.Qij.s) E I": if alld only if s is a cndible 
equilibrium ill r. III particular, A = {s : Vi E 1\·, and Vi.jo (i.jo, Qj.jo' s) E 1\} is tht sd 
of Cl'fdiblf cquilibl'ia of r. 
Proof 
First. if for all i E N. for all i.j and QiJ C Qi .. i ' (i.j. Qi.j, s) E I": then it is not dominated 
by any element in D. and no agent of i that plays after i.j, say i.k, can strike a credible 
d{'viation with s r-i.k· sand s r-i.h (Si.h,B-ih). This is true for all i ,i.j and in particular 
for i.j "# i.k. which. by definition 4, implies that s is a credible equilibrium. 
To pro\'e the converse. let s be a credible equilibrium ofr, so that. no agent after i.j can 
strike a credible deviation. If for some i.j and Qij, (i.j, Qi.j, s) f/. 1\ then it is dominated 
by some element in J":. This means that some agent that plays after i.j can strike a credible 
deviation. i.e. 3 i.k. Qi.k and s' = (SQLk' S-Q •. k)' such that (i.k, Qi.k, s') r- (i.j, Qij, si. 
Since U.k, Qik. s') E J";, s' is an equilibrium in r:.'k and, then, s' is a deviation from s 
struck by i.k. If i.1..· "# i.j, this contradicts the fact that s is a credible equilibrium. If 
i.k = i.j. by theorem 5.1 in Ferreira tl al. (1995) there exists another deviation s· struck 
by i.j such that s· is a credible deviation from s. But then s is no a credible equilibrium. 
which is a contradiction. 0 
The uniqueness of the abstract set stable is established in the following proposition. 
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Proposition 6 
Let F and T be abstract stable sets of the abstract system (D, >-) associated with a finite 
game as defined abot'(;. thw F = T. 
Proof 
Let {(i.jk. Qijk' Sk) h be an infinite sequence such that 
for all k. By the finiteness of the set of agents and of the set of strategies and because 
the dominance relation requires that i.jk+l play after i.jk, we have that, in the tail of 
the sequence. Qi.ik = Qi.ik+l and i.jk+l = i.jk. This tail is transitive. According to 
corollary 4b in Arce and Kahn (1991}.2 this is a sufficient condition for the uniqueness of 
the abstract stable set if it exists. 
o 
. 
Since the characterization of a credible equilibrium given in Proposition 5 is not based 
on recursion. it can be used to formulate a general definition of the concept, covering both 
finite and infinite games. 
Definition 7 
COllsidE /' a game of pa/eel neall ll'ith utilities changing during the play and u,ith an 
infinite or finitE numba of players and stratEgies. A StqutnCf 5 = (51, 52, ... ) is said to 
be a credible tquilibrium of r i/ and only if there is an abstract stable Sft (ASS). J{. for 
the as.sociaied syste 11l (D, >-l such that for all i EN, for all i -io and for all Qi .jo C Qijo' 
(i.jo. Qijo' 5) E J{. 
The abstract set h' is interpreted as a social norm, where every point in J{ equally 
reasonable: no one dominates any other in the social norm and any point outside the 
social norm is dominated by some element inside it. 
A major difficulty \\'ith this approach is that when the abstract system (D r-) is not 
finite or r- is cyclical 3. stable sets may not exist. Kahn and ~lookherjee (1992) provide 
examples of games with infinite action spaces where the stable set does not exist. 
4 Imperfect Recall. 
In this paper we follow the standard EX antt view on strategy choice, this implies that 
each agent evaluates the possible outcomes resulting from behavior and mixed strategies 
before the game. 
The perfect recall condition on information partitions is a basic assumption in the 
st udy of extensiYe games. This condition expresses the idea that a player remembers 
what he did and what he learned and seems natural for rational players. In our model. 
imperfect recall means that agents mayor may not have the ability to observe moves by 
2See Appendix 
"These cases could be an infinite game or imperfect recall 
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other agents of the same player. Since agents play only at one information set, the set of 
mixed strategies for that agent coincides with the set of behavioral strategies with and 
without the perfect recall assumption. The difference that imperfect recall introduces in 
our model is on the relation play after. 
Ferreira et al. (1995) suggest some applications in which perfect recall may not be a 
reasonable requirement. However, they do not pursue this idea furt.her. In this section 
we study this extension, and propose a notion of credible equilibrium for games without 
perfect recall. As we will see, one consequence of not having perfect recall is that we can 
no longer produce a recursive definition. When we try the ASS-approach, some difficulties 
arise as we cannot guarantee the existence of a unique stable partition even with a finite 
number of players. Hence we use the more general concept of semistability. Notice that 
the existence of the stable or semistable partition does not imply that the good set is not 
empty. 
Another consequence of not assuming perfect recall has to do with the specification 
of the permitted deviations. According to condition (iii) in definition 2 of the original 
credible deviations, after a credible deviation, no other agent after the one who proposed 
the de\'iat ion should be able to find a new one. ?\ow, this agent is not required to play 
with positive probability according to the first deviation, yet if he can strike a new one, 
that deviation was not credible. In the original framework (finiteness and perfect recall) 
this didn't represent any problem, since agents playing with probability zero will never 
gain from a deviation as they can only instruct agents after them, who, again. play 
wit h probability zero. Therefore, their actions won't change the expected payoffs when 
evaluated at the beginning of the play. Without perfect recall, this doesn't need to be the 
case. An agent that plays with probability zero may instruct agents that, according to 
him. may play after him and that. by changing their behavior. can make him play with 
positive probability. This is a very unnatural deviation to be permitted. Hence we have 
to prevent that possibility in the new definition. 
'Ye start by extending the relation play after to the case of imperfect recall and by 
giving an example of how this relation may be cyclical. 
Definition 8 
id r be a game u·ith or u'ithout perfect recall and u'ith utilities changing during the play. 
\re say that i.j plays a/ff.r i.1.: according to strategy s if there e.rists a path from the root 
of the game passing though y E Uj.k and x E Ui.j. if y comes before x in thE game tree, 
and if both agents play u:ith positit'e probability u'hen s is played. 
For a strategy s, let i.jo be an agent such that if i.jo plays after i.h according to s, 
then i.1.: plays after i.jo according to s. 
Remark 2 
If one uses this neu' relation plays after... according to strategy... in definition 2, the 
definition doesn't change as it refers to games of pafeel rEcall. 
The example in figure 4.1 illustrates how the lack of perfect recall may make the 
relation play after cyclical. Observe that, according to the strategy in which every agent 
randomizes between his strategies, agent 1.2 can play after 1.3 and agent 1.3 after 1.2, 
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because their information sets cross each other. Notice also that. according to strategy 
(R. L2. R3). agent 1.2 plays with probability zero. If we allowed t.his player to strike a 
de\'iation with agents that may play after him, he could suggest agent 1.3 to play L3, 
thus making him play with positive probability. These are the kind of situations that will 
prevented in the definitions in the next sections. 
[Insert FIGURE 4.1] 
l'\ow we extend the definition of credible equilibrium to games of imperfect recall, 
in which coalitions of players communicate prior to actual play and make non-binding 
agreements on strategy choices. We wish to know which agreements are stable in such 
en\"ironments. 
For a strategy S E X;ENS;, we denote by Qij(s) the set of all agents of i that 
play after i.j according to s. Define Qik(05) similarly. Inspired by definition 4 and by 
the discussion above. an abstract system. (D, ~~). is introduced with a new dominance 
relation ~~. Let Q;j C Q;.j(s) . Qik C Q;ds) and s. sE xS; 
D={(i.j.Qii'S): i.jEQijCQ;.j(s) SEx;SiiEN.jE{I, ... ,k;}} [4.1] 
(i.j. Qij. 5) ~~ (i.k. Qi.k. 05) if f 
(i) i.j plays after i.k according to s. 
(ii) hij(s) > hij(s). 
(iii) hih(S) > hih(05ih.S-ih). for all i.h E Qi.j, 
. (ir) sQ,) = s_Q,). 
An t'lement of D. that will be called an agreement, is a specification of the moves to 
be taken by all membt'r;, in the agreement. for a given list of moves for all other players. 
Condition (i) allows the analysis of games with crossing information sets as in figure 4.1. 
Only if agent i.j is reached with positi\"e probability under s he can strike a de\"iation 
from s. Condition (ii) states that i.j prefers the proposed deviation S rather than the 
initial strategy profile s. Condition (iii) implies that when i.h. a member of Qi.i' comes 
to play he prefers to comply with the deviation rather than with the strategy S. given 
that all other agents in Qi.i follow the de\'iation s. l\ote that conditions (ii)-(iii) of the 
dominance relation impose requirements only on players who play after i.j according to 
s. Also, notice that (D. ~~) reduces to (D. ~) for games of perfect recall. 
Our objective is to determine whether an agreement is stable, i.e. whether it is never 
dominated or is dominated only by an agreement that is dominated by an agreement that 
is never dominated or ... and so on. 
Von ::'\eumann and !\Iorgenstern established sufficient conditions for the existence and 
uniqueness of the abstract stable set by considering properties of an acyclical dominance 
relation on the abstract set. Unfortunately. the dominance relation ~~ is not acydicaL 
therefore we cannot use those sufficient conditions to show existence ofthe abstract stable 
set. This situation departs from the case of finite number of players and strategies and 
with an acydical dominance relation, where there always exists a unique partition of the 
abstract system in stable and non-stable sets. 
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Kahn and Mookherjee (1992) provide an example of a game in which a stable partition 
does not exist when considering an abst.ract system based on the concept of Coalition-
proof equilibrium. The example involves an infinite set of strategies. For this reason, 
these authors make a modification on the definition of stability. They show that a weaker 
version of stable partitions, called semistable partitions, always exists for arbitrary sets 
of objects and arbitrary dominance relations. 
Definition 9 
Ld (A, >-) bE an abstract system. A trio of subsets HI, B. U} of A form a semistable 
partition (SS?) of A if: 
(J) B consists of all dements dominated by dements in g. I.e .. x E B iff 3 x' E g 
sHch that x' >- x. 
(2) g consists of all dements that are not dominated or are dominated only by ele-
11unts in B. I.e .. x' E g iff u'henet'er x >- x'. thw J.' E B. 
(:3) 9 n B = 0 alld U = A\W U B). 
9 is called the good set, B the bad SEt and U the ugly set. 
Ideally. we would like to have a unique stable partition (i.e U = 0). because a 
semistable partition that is not stable contains an ugly set. which makes the solution 
concept ambiguous. Cnfortunately, in our case. the abstract system (D, >->-) does not 
admit a (>->- )-stable partition in general. as will be seen later on when studying the ex-
ample in figure ,j.l. .\ semistable partition is a weaker concept than a stable partition in 
the sense that the good and the bad sets do not exhaust the set of all agreements. One 
result on semist able partitions (Arce and Kahn. 1991) is that the ugly set contains cycles 
or infinite sequences of agreements dominating one another. none of which is dominated 
by a good agreement. \Ye will study the ugly set of (D. >->-) in more detail in t.he next 
sections. Before doing that. notice that semistable partitions may not be unique. Our ex-
tensions of credible equilibria will be based on one interesting class of them: The minimal 
semistable partition. 
Definition 10 
A >--sflllistablf partition {G-(>-), W(>-), C-(>-)} of D is minimal if it satisfies: 
C-(>-) c C(>-) , W(>-) c B(>-) and C-(>-) is the complemwt of G- U W for fl'ery 
semistablt partition {G(>-), B(>-). U(>-)} of D. ThEse sets {G", B", C"} arc callEd strictly 
good. strictly bad and strictly tlgly. l'€5pectirtiy. 
:\Iinimal semistable partitions can be constructed as follows (Kahn and Mookherjee 
(1991). first define the sets Go and Bo: 
Go = {(i.j.Qij.S) E D: not 3(i.k,Qik.S) E D : (i.k.Qi.k,S) >- (i.j, Qi.j, s)} 
Ba = {(i.j, Qij. s) E D : 3(i.J.', Qik, s) E Go : (i.k, Qi.k, s) >- (i.j, Qi.j, s)} 
~ext inductively define G;', BZ with k = 1, .... 
Gk = {(i.j, Qi.j, s) E D: if (i.k,Qi.k,s) >- (i.j,Qij,S) thw (i.k,Qik. s) E Bk_1 } 
Bi, = {{i.j.Qij.S) E D: 3(i.k.Qik'S) E Gk : (ih,H,s) >- (i.j,Qij,S)} 
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Define C" = Uk::OCj; and B" = Uf=oB;. And finally, define U" as the complement 
of C" U B" in D. 
Once the semistable partition is defined, one can use the elements on the strictly good 
set to define the equilibrium. The possible existence of a non-empty ugly set opens the 
possibility to strong and weak versions of equilibrium. 
Defini tion 11 
Let r be a game of imperfect recall as defined above, with a finite or infinite number 
of playas and stratfgies, let (D. H·') be an abstract systfm as dffinfd in [4.1]. and let 
{C". B". U"} be a minimal semisiable partition of D. A strategy s is said to be a strongly-
crfdible fquilibrium of r if for all i.jo and Qi.io C Qi.io (s), (i.jo. Qi.io, s) E C" (>->-). 
Our solution concept says that (i.jo. Qi.jo, s) is credible if it is dominated only by 
elements belonging to the strictly bad set. A weaker notion could also be defined as 
follows: 
Definition 12 
LeI r. (D. >->-) and {C". B". U"} bE dffinfd as bfforL A stratfgy s i8 said to bf a uoeakly-
crfdibif fqllilibri1l11l of r if for all i.jo alld Qi.jo C Qi.jo(S), U'f havf that (i.jo. Qi.jo' s) E 
G"(>->-) U ['"(>->-j. 
The weaker solution says that an element of D is credible if it is not dominated by 
any element in the strictly good set. These are standard ways of defining equilibria in the 
literature of semistability; however none of these definitions is entirely satisfactory. First, 
because the set G may be empty and, second. because some ugly elements may be uglier 
than others. The following section considers these points. 
'Ye end this section with an example of a game of imperfect recall in which the 
dominance relation turns to be acyclicaJ. The example illustrates the different implications 
of applying the original definition of credible equilibria and the ones just proposed. 
[Insert FIGCRE 4.2] 
Consider the game in figure 4.2. The strategy profile (LI. L2) is not credible according 
to t he original definition because agent 1.1 can instruct himself and agent 1.2 to move 
(RI. R2). If agent 1.2 knew that agent 1.1 was moving right, he would have certainly 
chosen to comply. But he does not know, and if he complies. then it behooves agent 
1.1 to remain at Ll as to get 3. So. the deviation (RI, R2) is perhaps not safe. but the 
original definition says nothing about this. 
'Ye could conclude that the original definition of credible equilibria is not appropriate 
in this context. and certainly it was never intended to be. If we apply the dominance 
relation >->- in 4.2. we get the following chain of dominations: 
(1.2. {1.2}. (L1. L2)) >->- (1.1. {1.1}, (Ll, R2)) >->-
>->- (1.1.X.(R1.R2)) >->- (1.1.N,(L1.L2)). 
:\otice that the first agreement is not dominated (it would need the participation of 1.1 
to go (RI. R2). but this is not possible as 1.1 does not play after 1.2). 
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Hence ((1.1, N, (Ll, L2)) , (1.1. {l.l}, (LI. R2)) are in the bad set and 
(Ll, X, (RI. R2)). and (1.2, {1.2}, (Ll, L2)) are in the good set. In other words, (RI. R2) 
and (Ll, L2) are credible equilibria. 
5 Cycles and Equivalence Classes. 
Consider the game in figure 5.1 and, for simplicity, consider only pure strategies. The follo-
wing relations can be easily checked. The agreements (1.2,1\', (R2. L3)) and (1.3. N. (L2. R3)) 
form a cycle since they dominate each other. Hence they belong to the ugly set. The 
agreement (1.3. X, (R2. R3)) (with 0 < E < J,.) is also in the ugly set as it is dominated by 
the two agreements in the cycle before, and~dominates the agreement (1.2, N, (L2, L3)). 
Finally (1.2. S. (L2. L3)) does not dominate any other agreement and, therefore. is also 
an element of the ugly set. This suggests the diyision of t he ugly set into a new partition 
where the elements in a cycle that are not dominated by elements outside the cycle may 
be considered good. In this section we present such a division. 
[Insert FIGCRE .5.1] 
One result on the structure of ugly sets that will prove useful is the following (Arce 
and Kahn (1991)): Let (D, >-) be an abstract system. and {G, B. C} a semistable partition 
on it. then. if F =F 0. F contains a stack. i.e. an infinite sequence {xdj such that XHl >- Xi 
for all i. Sometimes C contains cycles. which are stacks with a finite range. The strategy 
in this section consists ill identifying the elements within a cycle and in defining a new 
dominance relation on them. 
Definition 13 
Let (A. >-) he an abstract systfm. a cycle in (A. >-) tS a sequence u'ith finite range, 
{J·di:l. .n· slIch that J'j EA satisfies 
Let {G. B. ['} be a minimal semistable partition associated to (D. >->-). Suppose 
that U is a non-empty set and that it contains. at least. one cycle. As we saw in the 
example before. in this set some ugly elements may be uglier than others. We will use 
the methodology of stable sets to characterize these good-ugly elements in infinite games 
without perfect recall. Therefore. the idea is to partition the ugly set into two subsets, 
which can be denoted as the good-ugly and the bad-ugly, with the properties of internal 
stability and external stability. 
From the initial binary relation >->- we define the following binary equiyalence rela-
tion: 
(i.j. Qij. s) ....., (i.h. Qih, 5) [5.1] 
iffeither (i.j.Qjj's) = (i.h,Qi.h.s) or there exist sequences {x;}; and {Y;}i in D such 
that 
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Proposition 14 
Tin binary "tlation - on U dtfined above is an cquiralence relation. 
Proof 
It is trivial to show that the relation ..... is reflexive and symmetric. 
To show transitivity suppose that (i.j, Q, s) - (i.h, Qi.h, s) and (i.h, Qi.h, s) - (d·, Qi.k. s'). 
This implies that either (i.j,Qij,S) = (i.h,Qi.h.s) = (iJ',Qik,S') or 
(i.j.Qij.S) >->- Xl >->- "'Xr >->- (i.h.Qi.h'S) >->- YI >->- .. ·Yk >->- (i.j,Qij,S). 
and 
(i.h.Qih's) >->- Xl >->- .. ,xr.>->- (i.~·,Qi.k'S') >->- YI >->- ... ilk >->- (i.h.Qi.h.s). 
Then. (i.j.Qi.j.S) >->-.rl >->- ... (i.h,Qi.h.s) >->- j'l'" >->- (i.k.Qi.k.S'). But this 
implies that (i.j. Qi.j. s) - (U·. Qi.k. s'). 
o 
\Ye no\\' consider the quotient set obtained after the equivalence classes of - and 
define a domination relation on it. 
Definition 15 
Tilt classf8 of an fqllimlwu relation =: on A art tht fol/olring colhctions [a] definfd 
as [a) = {J' E A \ J' =: a}. The col/a·tion {[a]}aEA is dtllOted (AI =:) and called tht 
qllatlflll 8d 4 of A by =:. 
From t he ugly set C and t he initial relat ion >- >-. (F. >- >-). we define a new abstract 
system. 
((Cl -). ») 
where the abstract set is the quotient set of the equivalence relation [5) defined on the 
ugly set. alld the dominance relation is defined as follows: for [a]. [b] E (F/ -) 
[a) » [b] 
iff [a] f. [h] and there exist J' E [a) . y E [b) and a sequence {X;}i with Xi E F such that. 
J' >->- .1'1 >->- ... >->- xI' >->- y. 
For the general case a stable partition on ((U/ -).») may not exist. Consider then 
a minimal semistable partition, {Gu. BL'. Uu}. and the following sets: 
Gi·(-) = {x E U : [xl E Gd»)} and UD(-) = {x E U : [x) E Uu(»)}. \\'ith 
these elements we can formulate a new extension of credible equilibrium that IS more 
satisfactory than definitions 11 and 12. 
Definition 16 
Lt! r Ut a gamt u'ithout perfect recall, u'ith utilities changing during the play and with a 
finite or infinite numuo's of players. A strategy s is said to be a crediule equilibrium of 
4The reader is referred to Potter (1990), Chapter 2, for a detailed study on equivalence 
relations anJ quotient sets. 
I 
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r if f01' all i.jo E 1\". and Qi.jo C Qi.jo(S), U'€ hat'f that (i.jQ, Qi.jo, s) E G(~H U Gi,{-
) U Fi'+--). 
Clearly. for infinite games, credible equilibria are a subset of weakly credible and 
include the set of strongly credible. If we apply the three definitions to the example in 
figure 5.1 we get that the set of strongly credible equilibria is empty, while all four profiles 
of pure strategies are weakly credible. Of these. only (L2, L3) is not credible. 
At this point. it seems that one could consider again the possibility that some elements 
in Ci· are uglier than others and could repeat the whole procedure for this set Uir. The 
good news is that this is not the case as the set Uij does not contain cycles. This is 
established in the next proposition. 
Proposition 17 
Lt! ((["I -). ») be as defined aboVE. thw » is acyclical on (U I -). 
Proof 
\Ye use the following result: If a relation is asymmetric, irreflexive and transitive then it 
is acyclicaJ. It is trivial to show that the relation» is irreflexive and asymmetric. To 
show transitivity suppose that [a]. [b]. [cl E (Cl -) with [a] » [b] and [b] » [cl. These 
classes are different and there exist x E [a] y. y' E [b] and:: E [cl such that 
./' >->- ./'1 >->- '" >->- J~T' >->- y. 
y' >->- y~ >->- '" >->- y~ >->- ::. 
Since either y = y' 01' Y >->- YI ... >-~ y' (because y. y' E [b]), we have ;r ~~ '" >->- .:, 
whiclI im plies that [a]» [cl. 
o 
Jf t he abstract set is finite and the binary relation is acycJicaJ. then there exists a 
unique stable partition. Since we have eliminated the possibility of cycles, the only reason 
not to haw a stable partition is if (Cl -) is not finite. One interesting question for future 
research is to find conditions that guarantee the existence of a finite quotient set U."f -l. 
It is clear that a finite ugly set generates a finite quotient set. but there should be infinite 
ugly sets whose quotient set is finite. 
6 Existence 
:'\ot only in this work. but in all the literature using abstract stable sets, existence theo-
rcms are wry difficult to show. even in cases where counterexamples are also hard to find. 
This seems t he price to pay for being able to make non-recursive definitions. However 
this has not been a handicap for this methodology to be fruitful, providing important 
insights into many aspects of hard problems in Game Theory, especially, those related to 
the stability of coalitional deviations. 
:'\evertheless. we can show existence of an approximation of weakly credible equilibria 
for finite games with imperfect recall. The approximation is on the line of :-equilibria·. 
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Interestingly enough, in a very different setting, but still within the methodology of ab-
stract stable sets, and with a different kind of proof, Greenberg. l\londerer and Shitovitz 
(1996) were able also 1.0 prove only the existence of an e-conservat.ive equilibrium. 
Definition 18 
For any { > 0 definE (D. >->-cl as (D. >->-) e:rcept that conditions (ii) and (iii) in [4.1] 
are replaCEd u'ith 
(ii) hij{s) > hi.j{S) -! 
(iii) hih{s) > hih{sih.Lih) -E, for all i.h in Qi.j 
Then define E-weakly credible equilibria as weakly credible equilibria in definition 
12 replacing the dominance relation >->- with >->-c. In words. an E-weakly credible equi-
librium is like the weakly credible except that agents don't deviate unless they can win 
more than E > O. The next proposition shows that this new equilibrium exists for an 
important class of games. 
Proposition 19 
ThfrE fJ'isl :-u.·wkly Cl'Ediblt fquilibria. 
The proof of this proposition is established as a corollary of proposition 21. But 
before that. we need the fo\lmYing definition. 
Definition 20 
Df/illf f (6) = (T. P. C. C. p. h. 6) as r = (T. P. F. C. p. h), with the only difference that in 
f(6). for fn:ry agfnt of f!'fI'y pla.!Jf.I'. all pure slmtegies must be chosen u:ith a !,ositi!'e 
}l1"O[,ahilily that is multiph of 6> O. 
Remark 3 
FOT" this dEfinition to apply. it has to be thE caSE that for et1ery agent. the numbEr of 
straffgifS dil'idEd by 6 is an integer. It is aiIrays possible to define r{o) gamES u·hEn 
tilE original game is finitf. IFithin this neu: class of games u:e can apply thE diffErent 
definitions of crEdiblE Equilibria. Also notice that. for these gamES, if 071E playCl' plays 
aft(/' anothu according to a strategy. hE plays also after him according to any other 
stratf.qy. so therE is 710 HEEd to mah: a T'ffuE71Cf to the strategy. 
Proposition 21 
LEi f(6) be a game as dEfined above, if it is finite then it has at least one weaJ,:{y credible 
equilibrium. 
Proof 
St art wit h a strategy s. if it is not a weakly credible equilibrium, then there exist 
(i.jo. Qijo' s) and (i.j. Qij. s') such that (i.j, Qij, s') >->- (i.jQ, Qi.jo, 5). 
:\ow. if 5' is not a weakly credible equilibrium, then we find a new dominating devi-
ation and so 011. If at some point we reach a weakly credible equilibrium we are done. If 
not. we can construct a sequence of deviations. Since the number of agents and strategies 
is finite. we must haye the following cycle starting with some agent i.h: 
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(i.h, Qi.h, s") ~~ (i.k, Qi.k, s''') ~~ ... ~~ (i.h, Qi.h, s") ~~ '" 
'" ~~ (i.j, Qi.j, s') ~~ (i.jQ, Qi.jo, s) 
16 
There are two possibilities. Either the elements in this cycle belong alternatively to 
the good and the bad sets or all of them belong to the ugly set. Consider, then, the first 
possibility and the case in which (i.h, Qi.h, s") is in the good set. Since all strategies are 
completely mixed, all agents in the cycle play after each other according to any strategy 
(recall the remark above). This means that if s" is not a weakly credible equilibrium, 
the only deviations that upset it are due to other players or to agents of i that not play 
after i.h. Fix the part of the strategy s" for all the agents of i that play after i.h, i.e., fix 
SQoh' With the existing deviation we can repeat the same process that we started with 
(i.ia. Qiio' s). Every time we do this, either we encounter a weakly credible equilibrium 
or else we fix a strategy for a new set of agents. In the latter situation. by the finiteness of 
the game. eventually. we have fixed a strategy for every agent. The strategy profile that is 
the result of these fixed strategies must be a weakly credible equilibrium by construction 
(in fact. it would be a strongly credible equilibrium. since it would belong to the good 
set) since no agent can find a deviation that is not in the bad set. If (i.h,Qi.h.S") is in 
the bad set. (i. I. .. QiI" s"') is in the good and we can repeat the process to fix sQt.k' If 
the elements in the cycle are in the ugly set. the process can be repeated directly with 
(i.h. Qih. s") and the final strategy profile would be either in the good or in the ugly set, 
thus being a weakly credible equilibrium. 0 
Proof of Proposition 19 
Since payoffs are a continuous function of the probabilities with which mixed strategies 
are chosen. for every = there exists a 6 small enough so that every payoff that is the result 
of a strategy combination in f is within the E-neighborhood of a payoff in f(6). Hence, 
the weakly credible equilibrium in f(6) is an E-weakly equilibrium in r. 0 
Remark 4 
This proof Icorks Ifith any posilin: .0, bill not IfilhE = O. Tht rwson is tlL'ofold. Firsl, as 
= ~ x, lht Ilumbu of tit/IlUlls in the cycle may also go to infinily and ant cannot apply 
the (IIYUIIlOlt and. stcond. the sd of crcdiblc equilibria need not be compact (sa. Fel'Tfira 
tI al. for all ualllplc). 
'Ye end the discussion of existence with an interesting observation. In the original pa-
per by Ferreira et al .. the existence of credible equilibria was established as a consequence 
of having as a subset the set of agent-perfect equilibria. which is non-empty. When the 
assumption of perfect recall is dropped. in addition to all the difficulties we address in 
this work. this relation does 110t hold in general. The following is a counterexample. 
[Insert Figure 6.1] 
One can easily check that both agents mO\'ing right (dark arrows) is an agent-perfect 
equilibrium. The same can be said if both agents move left (white arrows). However the 
first cannot be a credible equilibrium. since either agent can strike a credible deviation 
by suggesting to go left. 
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7 Conclusions. 
'Ye have extended the definition of credible equilibria t.o infinite games and to games with 
non-perfect recall. By doing so we encounter a number of difficulties. The possibility of 
an infinite set of agreements and the fact that players may play one after the ot.her in a 
cycle called for a non-recursive definition based on semistable partitions. By studying the 
nature of the ugly set of this semistable partition, we were able t.o propose a new division 
of the agreements that is more satisfactory than the standard in the literature. 
Other problems remain open. It would be important to find necessary conditions 
to guarantee a finite quotient set in the equivalence relation defined on the ugly set. 
Another topics for further research include the extension of alternative definitions to 
credible equilibria like optimistic credible equilibria and its variants as defined in Ferreira 
Et al. (1995). Since all these definit.ions are extensions of the basic concept of Nash 
equilibrium. and since the model of changing preferences is intrinsically dynamic, it would 
be of interest to study extensions of refinements of l'\ash equilibria to this model. 
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APPENDIX 
The following concepts and results are contained in Arce and Kahn (1991). The 
reader is referred to them for more details. Here we have selected the minimum mat.erial 
needed to prove the proposition 6. 
it. 
Definitions: 
An demwt is (weakly) maximal on the set if no (other) element of the set dominates 
A stack is an infinite sequence {x;} such that Xi+l >- Xi for all i. 
An element is (weakly) subdued if it is dominated by a (weakly) maximal element. 
A stack is (weakly) subdued if it contains a (weak'ly) subdued element. 
A stack (Xi)i has a t1'Gnsitive tail if there is an n such that for {{'ay j > i > n, 
Xj >- Xi. 
A stack- (X;)i is intransitive if for no i it is the case that Xi+2 >- Xi. The 7'Elation >- is 
(u'wkly) quasi-Hwtually-tra7lsitil'f (QET) if ftHy int1'G7Isitil'f stack' is (U'wkly) subdued. 
TheOl'elU: 
If the relation >- is weakly qu~i-eventually-transitive (QET), then for any two semistable 
partitions {G,B,C} and {G',B'.F'}. GnB' = 0. 
Proof 
By contradiction. Consider the semistable partitions {G, B, U} and {G', B', U'). Since 
J'l E B' there exists X2 E G' such that .T2 >- Xl' The element X2 must be in B. Thus 
there exists an ;l'3 such that X3 >- X'2 and .T3 E G and X3 E B'. Since X3, Xl E G they 
cannot dominate each other. Similarly we can find an X4 which dominates .T3 and lives 
in both G' and B. X4 cannot dominate X2- Continuing in this way we build an infinite 
intransitiw stack. call it {Xt}. 
\\'eak QET implies 3xj E Xt which is weakly subdued. Yet because Xj E {xd. it 
is in the good set for some semistable partitions {Gj . Bj. Uj}. This is a contradiction 
because by definition the maximal element which subdues Xj cannot be in the bad set of 
any semistable partition. Therefore it is not possible for Xj E G,i for any j. 0 
Corollary: 
If >- is weakly QET and has a stable partition it is unique. 
I 
FIGURES 
Figure 4.1 
u 
Figure 4.2 
o 
o 
R2 
2 
2 
1/2 
Figure 5.1 
c 
0 
0 1 2 
0 1 ") 
Figure 6.1 
II 
o 
o 
0 
0 
1/2 
R2 
o E E 
o 2 2 
0 
0 
